Is the Real Estate Market Going to Crash?
Know the Warning Signs and What You Should Do Now
In 2017, a majority of Americans began worrying that the real estate market was going to crash. In fact, 58 percent of those surveyed agreed that there will be a "housing bubble and price correction" in the next two years. As a result, 83 percent of them believe it's a good time to sell.
There are plenty of signs that the housing market is heading into bubble territory. Most crashes occur only because an asset bubble has popped.
One sign of an asset bubble is that home prices have escalated. National median family home prices are 32 percent higher than inflation. That's similar to 2005, when they were 35 percent overvalued.
The Housing Bellwether Barometer is an index of homebuilders and mortgage companies. In 2017, it skyrocketed like it did in 2004 and 2005. That's according to its creator, Stack Financial Management, who used it to predict the 2008 financial crisis. Similarly, the SPDR S&P Homebuilders ETF has risen 400 percent since March 2009. It outperformed the S&P 500 rise of 270 percent.
The Case-Shiller national index hit record highs in December 2016. Price increases are concentrated in seven urban areas. Home prices in Denver and Dallas are 40 percent higher than their prerecession peaks. Portland and Seattle prices are 20 percent higher, and Boston, San Francisco, and Charlotte are 10 percent above their peaks.
Home prices in Denver, Houston, Miami, and Washington, D.C. are at least 10 percent higher than sustainable levels, according to CoreLogic.
At the same time, affordable housing has plummeted. In 2010, 11 percent of rental units across the country were affordable for low income households. By 2016, that had dropped to just 4 percent.
The shortage is the worst in cities where home prices have soared. For example, Colorado's stock of affordable rentals fell from 32.4 percent to only 7.5 percent since 2010.
In March 2017, William Poole, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, warned of another subprime crisis. He warned that 35 percent of Fannie Mae's loans required mortgage insurance. That's about the level in 2006. In some ways, these loans are worse. Fannie and Freddie lowered their definition of subprime from 660 to 620. That means the banks are no longer calling borrowers with scores between 620 and 660 subprime. Poole was the head of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas who warned of the subprime crisis in 2005.
In 2016, 5.7 percent of all home sales were bought for quick resale. These "flip" homes are renovated and sold in less than a year. Attom Data Solutions reported that's the highest percentage since 2006, during the last boom.
The 2008 Housing Market Crash
People who were caught in the 2008 crash are spooked that a 2017 bubble will lead to another crash. But it was caused by forces that are no longer present. Credit default swaps insured derivatives such as mortgage-backed securities. Hedge fund managers created a huge demand for these supposedly risk-free securities.
That created demand for the mortgages that backed them.
As many unqualified buyers entered the market, demand soared. Many people bought homes as investments to sell as prices kept rising. They exhibited irrational exuberance, a hallmark of any asset bubble.
In 2006, homebuilders finally caught up with demand. When supply outpaced demand, housing prices started to fall. That burst the asset bubble.
In September 2006, the National Association of Realtors reported that home prices had fallen for the first time in 11 years. Inventory was high, providing a 7.5 month supply. In November, the Commerce Department revealed new home permits were 28 percent lower than in 2005.
But the Federal Reserve ignored these warnings. It thought the economy was strong enough to pull housing out of its slump. It pointed to strong employment, low inflation, and increased consumer spending. It also promised to lower interest rates. That would give the economy enough liquidity to fuel growth.
The Fed underestimated the size and impact of the mortgage-backed securities market. Banks had hired "quant jocks" to create these new securities. They wrote computer programs that sorted packages of mortgages into high-risk and low-risk bundles. The high-risk bundles paid more but were more likely to default. The low risk bundles were safer, but paid less.
The ticking time bomb was the millions of interest-only loans. These allowed borrowers to get lower monthly payments. But these mortgage rates reset at a higher level after three years. Many of these homeowners could not pay the mortgage. Then housing prices fell and they couldn't sell their homes for a profit. As a result, they defaulted.
When times were good, it didn't matter. Everyone bought the high-risk bundles because they gave a higher return. As the housing market declined, everyone knew that the products were losing value. Since no one understood them, the resale value of these derivatives was unclear.
Last but not least, many of the purchasers of these MBS were not just other banks. They were individual investors, pension funds, and hedge funds. That spread the risk throughout the economy. Hedge funds used these derivatives as collateral to borrow money. That created higher returns in a bull market, but magnified the impact of any downturn. The Securities and Exchange Commission did not regulate hedge funds, so no one knew how much of it was going on.
The Fed didn't realize a collapse was brewing until March 2007. It realized that hedge fund housing losses could threaten the economy. Throughout the summer, banks became unwilling to lend to each other. They were afraid that they would receive bad MBS in return. Bankers didn't know how much bad debt they had on their books. No one wanted to admit it. If they did, then their credit rating would be lowered. Then, their stock price would fall, and they would be unable to raise more funds to stay in business. The stock market see-sawed throughout the summer, as market-watchers tried to figure out how bad things were.
By August, credit had become so tight that the Fed loaned banks $75 billion. It wanted to restore liquidity long enough for the banks to write down their losses and get back to the business of lending money. Instead, banks stopped lending to almost everybody.
The downward spiral was underway. As banks cut back on mortgages, housing prices fell further. That made more borrowers to go into default, which increased the bad loans on banks' books. That made the banks lend even less.
Nine Reasons Why a Housing Crash Isn't Imminent
- There are many differences between the housing market in 2005 and the current market. In 2005, subprime loans totaled more than $620 billion and made up 20 percent of the mortgage market. In 2015, they totaled $56 billion and comprised 5 percent of the market.
- Banks have raised lending standards. According to CoreLogic’s Housing Credit Index, loans originated in 2016 were among the highest quality originated in the last 15 years. In October 2009, the average FICO score was 686, according to Fair Isaac. In 2001, the average score was 490-510.
- Tighter lending standards has made a difference in the "flip" market. Lenders only finance 55 percent of the home's value. The "flipper" has to come up with the rest. During the subprime crisis, banks lent 80 percent or more.
- The number of homes sold today is 20 percent below the pre-crash peak. That means there's only a four-month supply of homes available for sale. As a result, about 64 percent of Americans own their own homes, compared with 68 percent in 2007.
- Home sales are lower because the recession clobbered young people's ability to start a career and buy homes. Faced with a poor job market, many furthered their education. As a result, they are now burdened with school loans. That makes it less likely they can save enough to buy a home. That will keep demand down.
- Home prices have outpaced income. The average income-to-housing cost ratio is 30 percent. In some metro areas, it's skyrocketed to 40 or 50 percent. Unfortunately, metro areas are also where the jobs are. That forces young people to pay more for rent to be close to a job that doesn't pay enough to buy a house. Thirty-two percent of home sales today are going to first time homebuyers, compared to 40 percent historically, says the NAR. Typically, this buyer is 32, earns $72,000 and pays $182,500 for a home. A two-income couple pays $208,500, on average.
- Homeowners are not taking as much equity out of their homes. Home equity rose to $85 billion in 2006. It collapsed to less than $10 billion in 2010, and remained there until 2015. By 2017, it had only risen to $14 billion. Obamacare is one reason for that. Bankruptcy filings have fallen 50 percent since the ACA was passed. In 2010, 1.5 million people filed. In 2016, only 770,846 did.
- Some people point that national housing prices have exceeded their 2006 peak. But once they are adjusted for 11 years of inflation, they are only at the 2004 level. Between 2012 and 2017, home prices have risen 6.5 percent a year on average. Between 2002 and 2006, they rose 7.5 percent annually. In 2005, they skyrocketed 16 percent.
- Homebuilders focus on high end homes. New homes are larger and more expensive. The average size of a new single family home is almost 2,700 square feet. That compares to 2,500 square feet in 2006.
What Could Cause a Collapse
Higher interest rates have caused a collapse in the past. That's because they make loans more expensive. That slows home building, decreasing supply. But it also slows lending, which cuts back on demand. Overall, a slow and steady interest rate increase won't create a catastrophe.
It's true that higher interest rates preceded the housing collapse in 2006. But that's because of the many borrowers who had interest-only loans and adjustable-rate mortgages. Unlike a conventional loan, the interest rates rise along with the fed funds rate. Many also had introductory teaser rates that reset after three years. When the Federal Reserve raised rates at the same time they reset, borrowers found they could no longer afford the payments. Home prices fell at the same time, so these mortgage-holders couldn't make the payments or sell the house. That's why default rates were so high.
The history of the fed funds rate reveals that the Fed raised rates too fast between 2004 and 2006. The rate was 1.0 percent in June 2004, doubling to 2.25 percent by December. It doubled rates again, to 4.25 percent, by December 2005. Six months later, the rate was 5.25 percent.
The Fed raised rates at a much slower pace since 2015. It raised it to 0.5 percent in December 2015. It raised it 1/4 point by the end of 2016, and to 1.25 percent by June 2017.
The real estate market could collapse if banks and hedge funds returned to investing in risky financial products. These derivatives were a major cause of the financial crisis. Banks sliced up mortgages and resold them in mortgage-backed securities. These securities were a bigger business than the mortgages themselves. That's why banks sold mortgages to just about anyone. They needed them to support the derivatives. They sliced them up so that bad mortgages were hidden in bundles with good ones. Then when borrowers defaulted, all the derivatives were suspected of being bad. That's why caused the demise of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers.
The Trump tax reform plan might trigger a fall in prices that could lead to a collapse. Congress has suggested removing the deduction for mortgage interest rates. That deduction totals $71 billion. It acts like a federal subsidy to the housing market. The tax break helps homeowners have an average net worth of $195,400. That's much greater than the $5,400 average net worth of renters. Even if the tax plan keeps the deduction, the tax plan takes away much of the incentive. Trump's plan raised the standard deduction. As a result, of Americans would no longer itemize. When that happens, they couldn't take advantage of the mortgage interest deduction. The real estate industry opposes the tax plan.
The market could collapse if the yield curve on U.S. Treasury notes became inverted. That's when the interest rates for short-term Treasurys become higher than long-term yields. Normal short-term yields are lower because investors don't require a high return to invest for less than a year. When that inverts, it means investors think the short-term is riskier than the long-term. That plays havoc with the mortgage market, and signals a recession. The yield curve inverted before the recessions of 2008, 2000, 1991, and 1981.
Will House Prices Fall?
In the last housing bubble, homebuilders submitted permits for new construction. That was less than 1 million in 1990 during the recession. It gradually rose throughout the 1990s, exceeding 1 million in 1998. It remained at that level until 2002, when it surpassed 1.5 million. It hit a new record of 2 million in 2004 and 2005. In 2006, housing prices began falling. Homebuilders sought more than 1.5 million permits. That fell to less than 1 million in 2007. By 2009, it had collapsed to 500,000.
They've only gradually recovered to 1.3 million in 2017. They are expected to drift lower, to 1.1 million by 2020.
When Will the Housing Market Crash Again?
The next market crash will occur in 2026, according to Harvard Extension School professor Teo Nicholas. He bases that on a study by economist Homer Hoyt. Real estate booms-and-busts have followed an 18-year cycle since 1800. The only exceptions were World War II and stagflation.
Nicholas says the 2017 real estate market is still in the expansion phase. The next phase, hypersupply, won't occur until rental vacancy rates begin to increase. If that occurs while the Fed raises interest rates, it could cause a crash.
How to Protect Yourself From a Crash
If you're among the majority of Americans who are worried, then there are seven things you can do to protect yourself from a real estate crash.
- Buy a house to live in, not to flip. Two-thirds of the homes lost in the financial crisis were second and third homes. When the sale price dropped below the mortgage, the owners walked away. They kept their homes, but lost their investments.
- Get a fixed-rate mortgage. As mortgage rates rise, your payment will stay the same. If this means you can only afford a smaller home, so be it. That's better than taking a risk and losing it later on.
- If you get a variable rate mortgage, find out what the interest rate will be when it resets. Calculate the monthly payment and make sure you can afford to pay it with your current income. Take the difference between that future payment and what you are paying today with the lower interest rate and save it. That way you will have the funds to pay your mortgage if your income falls.
- Buy the worst house in the best area you can afford. Make sure the area has good schools, even if you don't plan on having children yourself. Potential buyers will. You can always improve the house over the years if your income permits. Good neighborhoods aren't going to suffer as much in the next downturn as poorer areas. They will also bounce back quicker.
- Make sure your house has at least three bedrooms. That will attract families if you need to resell.
- The best way to protect yourself is with a well-diversified portfolio of assets. Diversification means a balanced mix of stocks, bonds, commodities and equity in your home. Most financial planners don't include home equity as an asset, but they should. It's the biggest asset most people own.
- To limit the damage of a real estate collapse, buy the smallest home you can reasonably live in. Try to pay off your mortgage early, so you don't lose your home in a downturn. Boost your investments in stocks, bonds, and commodities so they equal or exceed your home equity. If there is an asset bubble in housing, don't succumb to the temptation to refinance and take out the equity. Instead, revisit your asset allocation to make sure that it is still balanced.